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One of the most important developments in Italian politics in recent years has been the emergence
of the Five Star Movement, led by Beppe Grillo, which secured over a quarter of the vote share in
the 2013 Italian general election. Filippo Tronconi writes that while the scale of the Five Star
Movement’s success in its ﬁrst general election was remarkable, its ﬁrst two years in parliament
have seen the party struggle to meaningfully inﬂuence the policy process. He argues that a
normalisation of its organisational structure and a more clearly deﬁned ideological position in the
Italian party system would go some way toward preventing an erosion of the party’s support.
The Five Star Movement (FSM), after obtaining an impressive 25.5 per cent of the votes in the last Italian general
election, is facing a number of diﬃculties in managing its sudden electoral success. However, it is too early to
predict its imminent downfall, as some commentators do. On the contrary, the FSM is facing the typical challenges of
institutionalisation that all new parties have to face. Its survival depends on the willingness and ability to build
eﬀective sites and procedures of internal decision-making, that currently depend on Beppe Grillo’s leadership, and to
build a coherent political platform beyond that of anti-establishment protest.
The Five Star Movement’s challenge: institutionalise or die
‘I am pretty tired, as Forrest Gump would say’. It was November 28, 2014 when Beppe Grillo, after a ﬁve-year-
marathon of uninterrupted electoral rallies across the country, decided it was time to take a rest. On that occasion,
he announced through his blog the establishment of a ‘directorate’ made up of ﬁve people, chosen by Grillo himself
among his most trusted MPs. The directorate would “regularly meet” with Grillo “in order to analyse the general
situation, share the most urgent decisions and build, with the help of everybody, the future of the Five Star
Movement”. What in other parties could be regarded as an ordinary decision about an update of the organisational
chart, marks a crucial turning point in the short history of the FSM – at least symbolically.
Since its birth in 2009 the FSM has always taken pride in avoiding setting up any hierarchical structure similar to
those of other political parties. Indeed, its most distinctive motto is “each one counts as one”, meaning that decisions
should emerge from an exclusively horizontal exchange of ideas taking place on the internet and in face-to-face
assemblies at a local level. However, the outstanding electoral success the FSM obtained in the 2013 general
elections made this aspiration for direct democracy increasingly less credible. With a remarkable 25.5 per cent of
the popular vote the ﬁrst time it stood in a general election, the FSM achieved the most successful electoral debut of
a political party in post-1945 Europe, if one excludes founding elections. Overall, 109 Deputies and 54 Senators
were elected, all lacking any previous political experience.
This outstanding and largely unforeseen success forced the party to face a number of challenges, both within the
party and relative to its positioning in the Italian political system. Within the party a line of conﬂict soon emerged
between those who were in favour of a ‘moderate’ pragmatic approach, and thus open to limited agreements with
other parties in parliament, and those who wanted to keep the identity of the party close to the original anti-
establishment message and thus refusing any possible collaboration with other parties in parliament.
Another line of conﬂict is between those who questioned the leadership of Beppe Grillo on organisational and policy
issues and those who accepted the right of Grillo to have the last word on all of the FSM’s strategic decisions. The
two lines of division often overlap, because Grillo has always resolutely opposed any talk of possible agreements
with other parties (and the Democratic Party in particular). The result of these divergences has been a constant
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internal struggle and a long stream of expulsions of
MPs more or less openly diverging from the oﬃcial
line. As of April 2015, 35 MPs (18 deputies and 17
Senators) have left the FSM parliamentary groups,
over one ﬁfth of the original 163.
The prevalence of the hardliners within the party,
while presumably helping to preserve a strong
identity, has made it impossible for the FSM to deliver
any signiﬁcant policy outcome or gain a direct
inﬂuence over the main institutional decisions made
since the elections. This was evident since the
beginning of the legislative term, when the FSM
refused to support a government led by the
Democratic Party – which holds a plurality of seats in
both Chambers – and pushed the Democratic Party
into reaching an agreement with Berlusconi’s People
of Freedom party.
The main argument put forward in the FSM’s rhetoric (“they are all the same, we are the only real alternative to the
casta of professional politicians”) was undoubtedly strengthened, but the party missed an opportunity to play a
pivotal role in setting the agenda. Similarly, in other crucial decisions taken in the ﬁrst two years of the legislative
term, the FSM has been unable to make its votes decisive. The decision on a new electoral system, an ambitious
constitutional reform which set out to replace symmetrical bicameralism, the election of the President of the Republic
in January 2015: all these were occasions in which either the majority coalition was internally divided or a qualiﬁed
majority was required, leaving opposition parliamentary parties with some room for manoeuvre. In all these
instances, however, the FSM was unable to exert any inﬂuence over the decision-making process.
The aftermath of the 2014 European elections marked another critical turn. On that occasion the FSM obtained a
somewhat disappointing result (21.1 per cent of the votes), at least when compared with the 2013 general elections.
This was in spite of the favourable circumstances that in many other countries rewarded anti-euro and anti-
establishment parties. Having sent 17 representatives to the European Parliament, the FSM had to take a position
regarding which parliamentary group to join in Strasbourg. Some saw the greens as natural allies, given the
attention the FSM has traditionally paid to environmental issues. In a relatively surprising move, though, Beppe Grillo
insisted on reaching an agreement with Nigel Farage’s UKIP.
An online consultation was ﬁnally held, where the options to choose from were restricted – due to Grillo’s own
unilateral decision – to the Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy group (led by UKIP) and the European
Conservative and Reformists (including the British Conservative Party among others), as well as the possibility of
not joining any group. This alliance was justiﬁed in terms of the movement’s aﬃnity with UKIP on the issue of
Euroscepticism. However, criticisms were raised based on the xenophobic and populist stances supported by many
of the parties within the parliamentary group. It also seemed evident that, when forced to choose, Beppe Grillo
preferred to align with rightist movements, despite the rhetorical refusal to position the FSM on the left-right
dimension of the political spectrum.
Organisational problems
All these disputed decisions and disagreements originate from the very organisational nature of the FSM. The FSM
can be described as a charismatic party, as a movement party, and as a populist anti-establishment party. Each of
these descriptors help provide an understanding of the challenges Beppe Grillo’s creation has faced over recent
months, as well as the path to addressing them.
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As a charismatic party, its main problem lies in the diﬃcult process of institutionalising its leadership. As Harmel and
Svåsand argue, diﬀerent leadership styles are needed in order to tackle the challenges posed by each stage of the
organisational development of a party. A charismatic leadership (an authoritative ‘creator and preacher’, they say) is
useful in the ﬁrst phase in order to build the public image of the party, mobilise supporters around its message, and
resolve internal conﬂicts. The same attribute, though, can be harmful in the following stages .
After the initial breakthrough, the party needs to build an eﬀective territorial structure and coordinate its activities
internally (here an ‘organiser’ is needed); later on the party needs to establish itself as a credible political actor
externally (with a moderator, someone ‘with good personal credentials for credibility and dependability’). An electoral
breakthrough that occurs too rapidly can therefore be dangerous, as time is needed in order to institutionalise the
charismatic leadership and transfer the personal power of the founder to the organisation.
On the other hand, a charismatic leadership is antithetical to the idea of creating a formal apparatus that is typical of
traditional mass parties and would contradict the credo in a purely horizontal structure. The attempt to build an
intermediate governing body (the directorate, which I referred to in the opening of this article) is a response to this
strain, though a late and contested one, lacking any bottom-up legitimisation.
The nature of a ‘movement party’, as depicted by Herbert Kitschelt, makes the FSM unstable by deﬁnition.
Movement parties, in fact, normally represent the transition phase from a social movement, focused on issues with
a limited scope and the short-term engagement of members, to a fully structured political party. In this sense, the
success at the 2013 general elections and the entry of the FSM into the legislative arena mark a crucial turning
point: for as long as it was acting as a loose confederation of groups organised at local level, the party could
reconcile the presence of a national leader (the ‘megaphone’ of the movement, as Grillo calls himself) with relatively
autonomous local assemblies of activists.
However, when the party is expected to take decisions on national policy issues and strategies, this position
becomes more and more untenable . The probability of internal conﬂicts rises, and thus the need for a strong
centralised leadership. At the same time, the stronger the leadership, the more evident the contradiction with the
aspiration of the party to keep an entirely horizontal structure, where ‘each one counts as one’.
The hyperbolic (and naïve) narrative that described the internet as the tool to achieve the goal of direct democracy
and total transparency on all crucial decisions for the life of the movement has soon proven to be unrealistic.
Consultations with registered members have taken place from time to time, when Beppe Grillo has decided to do so,
and according to the procedures laid down by Grillo himself. What remains of a promise of hyper-democracy is a
‘leaderist’ party, with few spaces for an internal open debate, mostly restricted to the local level.
Finally, the FSM has built its electoral fortunes on an appeal of standing against the Italian political establishment.
Focusing on this populist (and popular) issue, and thanks to a leader that has been an outspoken enemy of the
ruling class for decades, allowed the FSM to gather votes from the full breadth of the ideological spectrum, from the
extreme left to the extreme right. The FSM has been able, in other words, to monopolise the issue of protest against
the corrupted ‘caste’ of politicians, while blurring its position on the traditional ideological space, mixing
environmentalist and anti-globalist claims with anti-immigration, Eurosceptic and anti-tax stances.
The problem with this strategy comes with the party moving into representative institutions, which requires it to take
sides on awkward issues. On the one hand, staying out of any possible negotiations with other parties preserved its
‘pureness’, but it also left the party unable to have any inﬂuence on the policy process. On the other hand, when
forced to reach an agreement, as was the case in the European Parliament with UKIP, it was inevitable for part of
the members to feel disappointed by the ideological direction that was implicit in the choice of allies.
Beppe Grillo’s FSM is facing the typical challenges of the institutionalisation of a new party, sharpened by a sudden,
unexpected electoral success. It is not necessarily doomed to a rapid decline. On the contrary, opinion surveys still
credit it with a large share of potential voters (around 20 per cent in recent polls). At the same time, its consolidation
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depends on the willingness and ability to ‘normalise’ its internal organisation and its positioning in the ideological
space.
On the organisational side it has to create locations and procedures to settle the inevitable tensions, something
which certainly requires a redeﬁnition of Grillo’s leadership, and this cannot be limited to the creation of the
‘directorate’ mentioned above. On the external side it has to consolidate its positioning in the ideological space on a
deﬁned and coherent set of issues, reaching beyond the realms of anti-establishment protest.
Filippo Tronconi is the editor of a new book on the Five Star Movement which has just been published by Ashgate
Please read our comments policy before commenting .
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